Bank Financing for SMEs around the World: Drivers, Obstacles, Business Models, and Lending Practices by Beck, Thorsten et al.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4785
Bank Financing for SMEs around the World




María Soledad Martínez Pería
The World Bank
Development Research Group


















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4785
Using data from a survey of 91 banks in 45 countries, 
the authors characterize bank financing to small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) around the world. They 
find that banks perceive the SME segment to be highly 
profitable, but perceive macroeconomic instability in 
developing countries and competition in developed 
countries as the main obstacles. To serve SMEs banks 
have set up dedicated departments and decentralized the 
sale of products to the branches. However, loan approval, 
risk management, and loan recovery functions remain 
centralized. Compared with large firms, banks are less 
exposed to small enterprises, charge them higher interest 
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rates and fees, and experience more non-performing 
loans from lending to them. Although there are some 
differences in SMEs financing across government, 
private, and foreign-owned banks — with the latter being 
more likely to engage in arms-length lending — the 
most significant differences are found between banks in 
developed and developing countries. Banks in developing 
countries tend to be less exposed to SMEs, provide a 
lower share of investment loans, and charge higher fees 
and interest rates. Overall, the evidence suggests that the 
lending environment is more important than firm size or 
bank ownership type in shaping bank financing to SMEs.  
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The financing of small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) has been a subject of great interest 
both to policy-makers and researchers because of the significance of SMEs in private sectors 
around the world. Data collected by Ayyagari, Beck, and Demirgüç-Kunt (2007) for 76 
developed and developing countries indicate that, on average, SMEs account for close to 60% of 
manufacturing employment. More importantly, a number of studies using firm-level survey data 
have shown that SMEs not only perceive access to finance and the cost of credit to be greater 
obstacles than large firms, but these factors constrain SMEs (i.e., affect their performance) more 
than large firms (Schiffer and Weder, 2001; IADB, 2004; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic, 2005; and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Maksimovic, 2006). While these 
studies have advanced our understanding of the demand side of SME lending, little research 
exists on the supply side of bank financing to SMEs across countries. Furthermore, there is often 
the perception among policy-makers that banks, especially large ones, are not interested in 
financing SMEs.
1 This paper tries to fill the void in the literature and to inform policy-makers 
about whether, why, and how banks are financing SMEs around the world. 
Using newly gathered data for 91 banks from 45 countries, this paper documents the state 
of bank financing to SMEs. First, we examine how banks perceive the SME segment, discussing 
the factors driving and impeding SME financing. On the driving side, we analyze the role of the 
segment’s profitability vis-à-vis other factors, such as competition and thinning margins in other 
segments. In terms of obstacles, we examine the importance of competition in the segment as 
well as of macroeconomic, regulatory, contractual, SME-specific, and/or bank specific factors. 
We also examine the role of government programs and of prudential regulations in driving and 
deterring SME finance.  Second, we describe the business models banks have adopted to serve 
SMEs. Here we examine whether banks have set up separate departments and/or decentralized 
their operations to serve SMEs. Also, we look into banks’ use of scoring models to approve loans 
and we investigate the main criteria banks consider when evaluating a loan, including the 
availability and types of collateral. Finally, we quantify the extent and type of bank lending to 
SMEs.  In particular, we examine the ratio of total loans going to SMEs, the percentage of 
                                                 
1 The majority of studies on bank financing to SMEs have focused on the US or other developed countries such as 
Germany, Italy and Japan. (See Berger, Rosen and Udell, 2007 for a recent review). applications approved, the share of loans financing investment, the share of secured loans, the 
share of non-performing loans, and the loan fees and interest rates associated with SME lending. 
Wherever possible, we compare SME to large firm financing. Also, we contrast the behavior of 
banks in developed and developing countries, as well as the practices of government, private 
(domestic), and foreign-owned banks. 
Our paper focuses on banks as opposed to other financial institutions because studies 
have shown that banks are the main source of external finance for SMEs across countries (see 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maskimovic, 2008). Furthermore, we concentrate on large banks due 
to their systemic importance and their significance as potential SME financiers. Until recently, a 
large literature had argued that small banks are more prone to finance SMEs because they are 
better suited to engage in “relationship lending”, a type of financing based primarily on “soft” 
information gathered by the loan officer through continuous, personalized, direct contacts with 
SMEs, their owners and managers, and the local community in which they operate, to mitigate 
opacity problems (see Berger, Kayshap, and Scalise, 1995; Keeton, 1995; Berger and Udell, 
1996; and Strahan and Weston, 1996). However, some recent studies (see Berger and Udell, 
2006; Berger, Rosen and Udell, 2007; and de la Torre, Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2008) 
have disputed this conventional wisdom and argued that large banks, relative to other 
institutions, can have a comparative advantage at financing SMEs through arms-length lending 
technologies (eg., asset-based lending, factoring, leasing, fixed-asset lending, credit scoring, etc.) 
instead of relationship lending.
2 Hence, we believe our focus on large banks is also justified by 
this recent literature.  
This paper is closely linked to and builds on a couple of previous International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and World Bank initiatives to better understand banks’ involvement with 
SMEs. The IFC (2007) study was conceived to identify “best practices” in bank involvement 
with SMEs, including key factors and links among business models, processes, tools, as well as 
the actual performance in SME banking. As part of this effort, the IFC developed its own 
questionnaire and in 2006 surveyed 11 banks assumed to be leaders in the SME business 
segment operating in Australia, Brazil, India, the Netherlands, Poland, Thailand, the UK, and the 
                                                 
2 Large banks are also the ones with the most extensive branch networks and, hence, the ones most accessible to 
SMEs, at least in terms of location.  
 
  2U.S. As part of a Latin American Regional study on SME finance, the World Bank (2007a) 
developed its own survey.  While the initial study focused on Argentina and Chile, similar studies 
were done for Colombia (Stephanou and Rodriguez 2008) and Serbia (World Bank 2007b). 
Finally, De la Torre, Martinez Peria, and Schmukler (2008) combine the data from the IFC and 
World Bank case studies, along with data from SME surveys in Latin America, to show that the 
conventional wisdom that relationship lending by small and niche banks is at the heart of SME 
finance is misguided, at least in the countries they consider in their sample. 
Though the questionnaire developed as part of this paper has elements of the surveys 
used by the IFC and World Bank in previous studies, there are a couple of important differences 
between our paper and the aforementioned studies. First, we cover a lot more countries than both 
other studies. In particular, we try to compare findings for developed and developing countries. 
Second, our questionnaire and this study places a lot more emphasis on obtaining and analyzing 
quantitative data on the extent, type, and pricing of bank financing to SMEs than the other 
studies. Finally, wherever possible, this study tries to compare SME financing to large firm 
financing, which the other studies do not do. 
Our data shows that banks perceive the SME segment as being very profitable. Banks’ 
reaction to government programs supporting SME finance is positive and prudential regulations 
are not considered a hurdle. Instead, banks perceive macroeconomic instability in developing 
countries and competition in developed countries as the main obstacles impeding SME finance. 
To serve SMEs, banks have set up dedicated departments and have decentralized the sale of 
financial products to the branches. However, the loan approval, risk management, and loan 
recovery functions remain centralized. Relative to large firms, banks are less exposed to small 
firms, charge them higher interest rates and fees, and, in relative terms, experience more non-
performing loans from lending to them. Compared to other bank types, foreign banks are more 
likely to engage in arms-length financing - they tend to rely more on scoring, are more likely to 
make loan decisions based on quantifiable information, and prefer to use real estate as collateral. 
Despite some differences in SME financing across bank ownership types, the most significant 
differences are found comparing banks in developed and developing countries. In particular, 
banks in developing countries are less exposed to SMEs, tend to provide a smaller share of 
investment loans, and charge higher fees and interest rates to SMEs relative to banks in 
  3developing countries. Overall, these comparisons suggest that the lending environment is more 
important in shaping bank financing to SMEs than firm size or the bank ownership type.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the survey used to 
gather our data. Section III examines banks’ perceptions of the SME segment, focusing on the 
factors driving and impeding SME finance. Section IV gets into the nitty-gritty of banks’ 
involvement with SMEs by describing the business models banks use to serve SMEs. Section V 
presents and analyzes data on the extent, type, and pricing of banks financing to SMEs across 
countries and across bank ownership types. Finally, Section VI concludes. 
II. The  Survey 
To gather information on bank financing to SMEs around the world, we designed a survey with 
56 questions focusing on three main areas. First, the survey examines how banks perceive the 
SME segment. In particular, the survey asks banks about the drivers and obstacles to SME 
financing. Also, the survey inquires about banks’ perception of the role of government programs 
to support SME finance and of banking prudential regulations. Second, the survey includes 
questions related to the business models used by banks to serve SMEs. In particular, the survey 
asks whether banks have separate specialized departments to manage their business with SMEs; 
whether sales decisions are separated from risk management; whether SME loans are processed 
at the branches or at headquarters; whether credit scoring is used to approve SME loans; about 
the types of criteria considered when evaluating SME loans; and the types of collateral most 
frequently used in SME lending. Finally, the survey tries to gauge the extent, type, and pricing of 
bank financing to small, medium-sized, and large enterprises. To measure the extent of banks’ 
involvement with SMEs, the survey gathers data on the share of lending to small, medium-sized, 
and large enterprises vis-à-vis total loans. To characterize the type of financing, the questionnaire 
collects information on the share of loans devoted to investment purposes and the ratio of loans 
that are collateralized or secured. To describe the pricing of SME loans, the survey gathers data 
on the fees and interest rates charged on these loans.  
  Our questionnaire includes quantitative and qualitative questions. For quantitative 
questions, we report averages across banks.  Information on the qualitative questions is conveyed 
by reporting the percentage of banks that chose each option provided under each question. 
  4Because the number of banks covered in each country in our survey is small, we do not show 
individual country-level responses. Instead, we report data, for banks operating in developed and 
developing countries, and separating by bank ownership type (i.e., distinguishing between 
private domestic, government, and foreign-owned banks).  
Table 1 shows the number of banks and countries that responded to our survey along with 
the banks’ market share.  We obtained responses from 91 banks in 45 countries. On average, the 
banks that responded account for 32% of banking system loans. The loan market share exceeds 
30% for 24 countries. For 25 countries, we were able to get a response from the largest bank in 
the system.  We obtained multiple bank responses for 30 countries: for 4 countries we got 4 
banks to respond in each country, for 8 countries we received responses from 3 banks, and for 18 
countries we obtained 2 bank responses. Only one bank responded in 15 countries. Among the 
45 countries in our sample, 38 are developing and the remaining 7 are developed. Our dataset 
covers 14 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 9 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 8 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, 4 in South Asia, 2 in the Middle East and North Africa and 1 in East 
Asia. All 7 developed countries are in Western Europe.  Overall, we have 11 banks that operate 
in developed countries and 80 banks operating in developing countries.  In terms of bank 
ownership types, our sample includes 17 government-owned banks, 32 domestic private banks 
and 42 foreign-owned banks.   
Rather than giving banks a predetermined size classification of firms, the survey asks 
banks to provide their own definition of small and medium-sized firms. In particular, banks were 
asked to provide a range in terms of sales, assets, or employees. Most banks (85%) define SMEs 
in terms of annual sales. In particular, on average, banks define small firms as those with annual 
sales between 200,000 and 4 million dollars and medium-sized firms as those with sales between 
2 and 16 million dollars in sales.
3 The average midpoint of the range for small firms is 2 million 
dollars and for medium-sized firms is 9 million dollars. 
The definition of an SME is not very different across banks. Figures 1a and 1b plot the 
cumulative frequency of the midpoint for the range provided as definition for small and medium- 
sized firms, respectively. Close to 70 percent of banks define small and medium-sized firms as 
                                                 
3 Banks were asked to provide a range for their definition of small and medium-sized firms. The averages mentioned 
here refer to the lower and upper limits of the range provided by each bank. 
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provided by banks is remarkably similar to the average annual sales reported by small and 
medium-sized firms in recent enterprise surveys conducted by The World Bank for the countries 
in our sample. The annual sales of small firms (defined in the enterprise surveys as those with 
less than 20 employees) average 1.8 million dollars and those of medium-sized firms (those with 
20 to 99 employees) average 14.5 million dollars. Since the enterprise survey samples are 
constructed to be representative of the universe of firms in each country, this suggests that banks 
are defining SMEs in a way that is consistent with the actual size distribution of firms. In other 
words, these statistics reduce the concern that banks’ definition of SMEs refers to firms that are 
substantially larger than those operating in the countries in our sample. 
III.  Banks’ perception of the SME segment 
Our survey includes a number of questions related to how banks perceive the SME segment. 
Banks are asked about the size and prospect of the market, the drivers, and obstacles to their 
involvement with SMEs, and the role of government programs and regulations. Figures 2a and 
2b show that most banks (80% or more), independent of where they operate and of their 
ownership type, perceive the SME segment to be big and with good prospects. In terms of 
drivers, Figure 3a reveals that the perceived profitability of the segment is the most important 
driver for banks’ involvement with SMEs. 81% of banks from developed countries and 72% of 
banks from developing countries indicate that this is the most important determinant for their 
involvement.  However, as seen in Figure 3b there are some differences across bank ownership 
types. While private and foreign-owned banks point to the profitability of the segment as the key 
driver, government-owned banks are less driven by the profitability of the market (only 47% 
rank profitability as the key driver compared to 83% of foreign and 75% of private banks). 
Among government-owned banks, competition faced in other segments is also an important 
consideration (18% and 12% of government banks rank competition for large corporates and 
retail customers, respectively, as the key driver to SME involvement). 
While most banks seem to agree on the factors driving their involvement with SMEs and 
perceive prospects in this segment to be very good, there is more disagreement regarding the 
obstacles to SME financing. Among banks in developed countries (see Figure 4a), the top 
  6obstacle seems to be competition in the SME segment (45% of banks in developed countries give 
the highest rating to this obstacle). On the other hand, among banks in developing countries, the 
top rated obstacle is the macroeconomic environment (39% of banks indicate this as the top 
reason impeding their growth in the SME segment).
4 Surprisingly, only 8% of developing 
country banks rate the legal and contractual environment as the top obstacle. This suggests that 
perhaps banks adapt to the legal and contractual environment in which they operate by offering 
instruments that allow them to circumvent existing deficiencies (See de la Torre, Martinez Peria, 
and Schmukler 2008). Again, there are differences across banks of different ownership types 
(Figure 4b). Government-owned banks rank regulation and the macroeconomic environment as 
the most important obstacles, while foreign-owned and privately-owned domestic banks rate the 
degree of competition in the SME segment along with the macroeconomic environment as the 
most prominent obstacles.  
Together with questions on the drivers and obstacles to bank involvement in the SME 
segment, the survey also collects information on the role of government programs and 
regulations. Banks report that government programs to promote SME finance exist in 6 out of the 
7 developed economies and 32 out of the 45 developing countries in our sample. Consistent with 
recent evidence (Beck, Klapper, Mendoza, 2008; Honohan, 2008), guarantee schemes are the 
most common government program used to support SME financing among developed and 
developing countries. According to the surveyed banks, such schemes are in operation in 6 
developed countries and 28 developing countries. Directed credit programs are the second most 
popular among developing countries. They are in place in 24 developing countries. Among 
developed countries, interest rate subsidies are the second most common, they exist in 5 of the 7 
countries in our sample. Interest rate subsidies are also prevalent among developing countries, 23 
economies have them in place. Regulatory subsidies (such as lower provisions or capital 
requirements for SME lending) are less common. Only 16 developing countries and 3 developed 
countries have these. 
In general, banks in developed and developing countries have a positive perception of 
government programs to support SMEs (Figures 5a). In developing countries more than 70% of 
                                                 
4 We also ask banks to list the macroeconomics factors that were most problematic. Most banks mention macro 
instability, high interest rates, and exchange rate risk. 
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positive. Regulatory subsidies are less popular with only 47% of banks rating them as having a 
positive influence. But, these programs are less common and in most cases they are rated as 
inconsequential. Among, developed countries more than 50% of banks rate government 
programs as having a positive effect on their involvement with SMEs. Comparing banks by 
ownership type (Figure 5b), reveals some differences in how banks rate guarantee programs. 
While more than 80% of government and foreign banks rate guarantee programs positively, only 
52% of private domestic banks do so. On the other hand, more than 70% of government,  private 
and foreign-owned banks give a positive rating to interest rate subsidies and directed credit 
programs. 
Not surprisingly given how ubiquitous guarantee programs are, banks from developed 
and developing countries rate them as the most important government program influencing SME 
financing (Figure 6a). Specifically, 50% of developed country banks and 55% of banks from 
developing countries rate guarantees as the most influential government program. Once again, 
we observe some differences across bank ownership types (Figure 6b). While foreign banks 
seem to overwhelmingly prefer guarantee programs (over 70% of foreign banks rank guarantee 
programs first), government and private banks seem split between guarantee schemes and 
directed credit programs. 
It is important to be careful in interpreting banks’ responses regarding the impact of 
government programs. Banks might have a positive view of these programs and perceive them as 
influential, even if they are not successful in terms of their public policy objectives. For example, 
banks can rate the effect of these programs as positive because they enable them to offer cheap 
or longer term financing to their existing clients, allowing them to solidify their existing banking 
relationships. Yet, the programs might be failing the goal of extending bank financing to SMEs 
that had not borrowed in the past. Hence, while it is interesting to know banks’ perception of 
government programs, an evaluation of their true impact requires much more careful analysis 
and data. 
Aside from the role of specific programs to promote SME financing, governments can 
influence banks’ involvement with SMEs through the regulations that they put in place. Figures 
  87a and 7b illustrate banks’ perceptions of the role of regulations concerning documentation 
requirements for lending to SMEs, while Figures 8a and 8b show banks’ impression of how 
prudential regulations affect their involvement with SMEs. Close to two third of all banks, 
regardless of country of operation (Figure 7a) or bank ownership type (Figure 7b) indicate that 
they perceive documentation requirements for lending to SMEs to be “appropriate and 
beneficial”. Similarly, most banks consider prudential regulations to have a positive or 
inconsequential effect on SME financing (Figure 8a and 8b). This is an interesting finding, given 
that recent country studies (Adasme, Majnoni and Uribe, 2006) have found that capital 
requirements can bias against SME lending, as SME loans are more risky overall but have less 
tail risk than large enterprise loans.  
Access to credit history information appears to be particularly important for banks in 
developing countries (Figure 9a). More than two thirds of developing country banks respond that 
the existence of a credit bureau in their country facilitates SME lending. On the other hand, only 
44 percent of banks from developed countries rate the existence of a credit bureau as beneficial 
for SME lending. Similarly, access to credit information seems more relevant for foreign relative 
to domestic banks (Figure 9b). These differences might reflect the fact that SME opaqueness 
(e.g., lack of verifiable financial statements for the firm) and perhaps informality are greater 
issues for banks operating in developing countries and for foreign banks. The latter might have 
less first-hand experience with local borrowers and, hence, might have to rely more extensively 
on credit bureaus.
5 
In summary, banks are attracted to the SME segment due to its perceived high 
profitability and good prospects. Relative to private domestic and foreign banks, government 
banks’ involvement with SMEs is in part driven by thinning margins in other segments.   While 
banks in developed countries see competition as a major obstacle, banks in developing countries 
point mainly to macroeconomic conditions.  Banks’ reaction to government support programs is 
positive overall and prudential regulations are not perceived as a hurdle. Access to information 
                                                 
5 The differences found for banks in developed and developing countries are also consistent with aggregate results 
from Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) who find that the quality of credit information sharing is more 
important for financial deepening in developing than in developed countries.  
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countries and by foreign banks. 
IV.   Banks’ business models in serving SMEs 
In this section, we examine the business models banks follow to serve SMEs. In particular, we 
address questions such as: how do banks structure their operations to serve SMEs? What degree 
of decentralization do they allow for? How do banks make lending decisions? What criteria do 
banks use to make loans? What types of collateral are most commonly used?  
Most banks, independently of their country of operation or ownership type, have set up 
separate departments to manage their relations with SMEs (Figures 10a and 10b). More than 
60% of banks have an SME department, separate from the division that deals with large 
businesses. Banks in developed countries are more likely to distinguish between small and 
medium-sized firms. Relative to private and foreign-owned banks, government banks are 
somewhat less likely to have separate SME departments. While 93% of private and foreign-
owned banks have separate departments for SMEs, approximately 80% of public banks do so.
6  
The majority of banks operating both in developed and developing countries have 
decentralized the selling of non-lending products to small and medium-sized enterprises (Figure 
11a). 61% of banks in developing countries and 70% of banks operating in developed countries 
respond that the sales of non-lending products to small businesses is done only or primarily at 
branches.
7 Relative to foreign and government-owned banks, private domestic banks are 
somewhat less likely to decentralize the sale of non-lending products (Figure 11b). Only 50% of 
private banks say they have decentralized the sale of non-lending products compared to roughly 
70% of government and foreign-owned banks. 
In contrast to sales, banks’ loan approval, risk management, and non-performing loan 
recovery functions tend to be more centralized, in particular, among developing country banks 
(Figure 11a). The differences are particularly striking for loan approval and risk management. 
                                                 
6 Here we are summing the percentage of banks that responded that they have a separate department for small firms, 
for medium sized firms, for SMEs combined, and for small and medium sized enterprises separately.  
7 Decentralization is somewhat less prevalent when it comes to medium-sized lending. 60% of developed country 
banks and 51% of developing country banks select the same option for medium-sized enterprises. 
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primarily at branches, only 19 % of banks operating in developing countries report this option for 
small business lending. Similarly, 40% of developed country banks respond that risk 
management for small business lending is done only or primarily at branches, relative to 8% of 
developing country banks. Comparing banks across ownership types, government-owned banks 
are significantly more likely to decentralize loan approval, risk management, and the recovery of 
non-performing loans (Figure 11b).   
Banks from developed and developing countries are more prone to use scoring models in 
making decisions regarding small rather than medium-sized enterprise loans (Figure 12a). Only 
18% of developed country banks say they do not use scoring for small business lending, while 
almost 45% report not using scoring for medium-sized enterprise lending. Among banks in 
developing countries, a higher percentage is not using scoring, not surprisingly given that they 
tend to operate in less sophisticated markets with less information available. Comparing banks 
by ownership type, foreign-owned banks are somewhat more likely to rely completely on scoring 
for credit decisions than domestic banks, for both small and medium-sized enterprises. This 
might reflect that foreign banks have better statistical models and/or have less direct contact with 
borrowers and, hence, have to rely more on arms-length lending techniques. 
But scoring is used primarily as one input in the lending decision process.  Among banks 
in developing countries, only 10 (seven) percent of banks report approving small (medium-sized) 
business loans purely based on scoring as opposed to 55(44) percent that report using scoring as 
an input for small (medium-sized) business lending (Figure 12a). Among banks in developed 
countries, 82 percent say that scoring is only an input into loan decisions for small businesses 
and 55 percent give the same response in connection to loans to medium-sized enterprises. 
Foreign banks are most likely to either rely completely or not use scoring at all in lending to 
small and medium-sized enterprises (Figure 12b). 
In terms of the specific factors that banks consider in evaluating loans, we examine 
separately the criteria used for small and medium-sized business lending and compare this to 
banks’ responses regarding lending to large firms.  In particular, Figure 13a reports the 
percentage of banks that rank each criterion presented as the most important for small, medium-
  11sized, and large business lending, respectively. The financial assessment of the business is the 
most important consideration across all firms, although it is more important for large (64%) than 
for small enterprise lending (49%).  A firm’s credit history with the bank is the second most 
important criterion, with the owner’s characteristics and the purpose of the loan being next in 
importance.   
Examining more closely the factors relevant for small business lending, we observe some 
differences between banks in developing and developed countries (Figure 13b). While the size of 
the loan is the second-most important criterion for developed country banks (20%), the firm’s 
credit history with the bank is the second most important factor in developing countries (16%). 
There are also some differences across bank ownership types (Figure 13c). Most notably, 
foreign-owned banks tend to base their decisions more on the financial assessment of the 
business than domestic-owned banks. Specifically, 58% of foreign-owned banks see the financial 
assessment as the most important criterion compared to 37% of privately-owned domestic banks. 
This is consistent with privately-owned banks being better able to screen customers using soft 
information and foreign-owned banks relying mostly on hard, quantifiable information.  
At least three-quarters of banks require collateral to make business loans (Figure 14a). 
Furthermore, there are no significant differences for small, medium-sized, and large firm 
financing. As expected, however, given that the informational and institutional environment is 
weaker in developing countries, a slightly higher percentage of banks require collateral to make 
business loans in these countries relative to banks in developed countries. Comparing across 
bank ownership types (Figure 14b), we observe that government banks are somewhat more prone 
to require collateral from medium-sized and large firms relative to the other bank types. While 
100% of government banks state that they require collateral for medium and large firm 
financing, close to 90% of private domestic and foreign-owned banks respond in a similar 
fashion. 
Real estate is the most frequently accepted type of collateral for business lending, 
regardless of firm size (Figure 15a). Close to 40% of banks rank real estate as the most important 
type of collateral used for small, medium, and large firm financing. Cash and other liquid assets 
are the second most important forms of collateral used across all firm sizes (approximately 22% 
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guarantees (10-15% of banks). 
Comparing banks in developed and developing countries, we find that real estate is more 
frequently ranked as the most important collateral type by banks in developed countries relative 
to those in developing countries (Figure 15b). Almost 56% of banks in developed countries 
indicate that real estate is the most important type of collateral for small business lending, 
compared to 37% of banks in developing countries. There is more variety in the type of collateral 
that banks in developing countries consider important. While banks in developed and developing 
countries rank cash, liquid assets, bank and personal guarantees as important collateral types, 
only banks in developing countries (although a percentage less than 15%) seem to rank land and 
equipment as important types of collateral.  
There are some notable differences in terms of the assets used as collateral across bank 
ownership types (Figure 15c). While for foreign banks real estate is the dominating asset used as 
collateral (54% of banks rank real estate at the top), for privately-owned domestic banks, cash 
and other liquid assets are the most important asset (33%). Government-owned banks seem to be 
relatively evenly split as to how they rank the importance of different collateral types. 
Approximately one quarter of government-owned banks rank real estate, land, and equipment as 
important, respectively. On the other hand, only a small percentage of foreign or private 
domestic banks rank land and equipment as important. 
Summarizing, banks across all countries have set up separate departments to serve SMEs, 
have decentralized the sale of financial products to the branches, but continue to centralize the 
loan approval, risk management, and loan recovery functions. Though scoring models are used 
by most banks in the sample, especially in small business lending, they are only one input in the 
loan decision process. Relative to other banks, foreign banks are more likely to engage in arms-
length financing, since they are more prone to use scoring, to rely on quantitative information 
when making loan decisions, and to prefer real estate as collateral. Finally, we also observe some 
differences in the lending criteria and collateral used by banks operating developed vis-à-vis 
developing countries. In particular, banks in developing countries are relatively more likely to 
make lending decisions based on a firm’s credit history with the bank and the firm owner’s 
  13characteristics – a sign that banks in developing countries might be more likely to engage in 
relationship lending. Furthermore, while real estate is the most important collateral for SME 
loans around the world, it is less so in developing countries where liquid assets are also 
commonly used as collateral.  
V.  The state of bank financing to SMEs 
This section quantifies the extent, pricing, and type of financing banks extend to SMEs. First, we 
compare averages in small, medium, and large firm financing for all banks combined; separately 
for banks in developed and developing countries; and finally, distinguishing between 
government, private (domestic), and foreign-owned banks. Second, within each firm size 
category, we contrast means for banks across countries, separately, and across ownership types.  
Comparing SME to large firm financing for all banks and countries combined, we 
observe that banks are less exposed to SMEs, experience more defaults on loans to these firms 
and charge them higher fees and interest rates (Table 2, Panel A). The share of bank loans to 
small (medium) firms averages 11% (13%), while banks’ exposure to large firms averages 32%. 
Fees on small (medium) business loans average 1.11% (0.96%), while they average 0.76% for 
loans to large firms. The share of non-performing loans for small (medium) business loans is 
7.4% (5.7%), while it averages close to 4% on loans to large firms. Across all these variables, 
differences between small versus large firm financing features are statistically significant. 
However, with the exception of loan exposures, differences in medium-sized and large firm 
financing features are not statistically significant.   
Separating banks by country of operation, we find the same pattern, except that 
differences between small and large firm fees, interest rates, and non-performing loans are only 
significant for banks in developing countries (Table 2, Panel B). Comparing SME to large firm 
financing across bank ownership types (Table 2, Panel C), we see that while differences in the 
share of loans directed to SMEs and, separately, large firms are present for all types of banks, 
differences in fees and non-performing loans are only statistically significant for foreign banks 
and government-owned banks, respectively.  
  14Comparing the characteristics of SME financing across countries, we find many 
significant differences (Table 3). In fact, we find more differences comparing SME financing 
features across countries than the differences we unveiled in SME versus large firm financing. In 
particular, we find that the share of loans to small and medium-sized firms relative to total loans 
and the percentage of investment loans are significantly lower among developing countries, 
while loan fees and interest rates on both small and medium-sized firm loans are significantly 
higher in these countries, relative to developed countries. 
There also are some differences in SME financing characteristics across bank ownership 
types, but these are less significant than what we found comparing developed and developing 
countries (Table 4). In particular, the share of applications approved by foreign banks is 
statistically lower while their loans fees are statistically higher than those observed for 
government-owned banks. At the same time, the share of secured loans is higher among foreign 
relative to domestic-owned banks. Relative to government-owned banks, private banks have a 
lower share of secured loans, higher fees, and higher interest rates. It should be noted, however, 
that differences in fees and interest rates are only significant at 10%.  
Summarizing, banks are less exposed and charge higher interest rates and fees to SMEs 
relative to large firms. At the same time, banks experience higher non-performing loans from 
lending to SMEs. Though there are some differences in SME financing across government, 
private, and foreign-owned banks, the most significant differences are found comparing banks in 
developed and developing countries. Banks in developing countries tend to provide a lower share 
of investment loans and to charge higher fees and interest rates. Overall, the evidence suggests 
that the lending environment is more important in shaping bank financing to SMEs than firm size 
or bank ownership type.  
VI. Conclusions 
This paper reports on a survey of banks around the world to document the state of SME 
financing across countries and to compare it to large firm financing, wherever possible. We find 
that across countries, banks perceive serving SMEs as a profitable endeavor and almost all banks 
have SME clients. Though we find significant differences in exposure, lending practices, 
business models, drivers and obstacles of SME finance for banks operating in developed vis-à-
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vis developing countries, we uncover fewer and smaller differences when we compare banking 
to SMEs relative to large firms within countries. The differences between developed and 
developing countries are likely to reflect deficiencies in the contractual and informational 
frameworks in developing countries and less stable macroeconomic environment. Differences 
across banks of different ownership types are also less pronounced than differences across 
countries and are mostly in line with the literature.  Specifically, foreign-owned banks rely more 
on hard verifiable information for lending decisions and real estate as collateral.  On the other 
hand, contrary to conventional wisdom, foreign-owned banks do not seem to lend less to small 
and medium-sized enterprises than private domestic banks.  
While a large literature has used firm-level data to analyze differences in access to 
finance by firm size, this paper is a first step in better understanding SME financing from the 
supply side.  Going forward, it would be interesting to expand the number of banks and countries 
surveyed in order to see if we can corroborate our findings in a larger sample. Also, it would be 
useful to explore in greater depth what drives differences across developed and developing 
countries and between different bank ownership types.  Finally, combining demand-side data, 
such as firm-level surveys, and supply data, as presented in this paper, might allow identifying 
the remaining bottlenecks in SME lending and thus help policy makers develop priorities. 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of survey respondents 
Table shows the countries in our sample, the number of banks that responded from each country (including whether 
the largest bank has participated in the survey), and the market share of respondents relative to total loans. 
Country  No. of Banks  Has largest bank responded?  Market share covered 
(% of loans to total system loans) 
Albania  3  Yes  59% 
Armenia  3  Yes  35% 
Austria  1    1% 
Belarus  1  Yes  48% 
Belgium  1    10% 
Bosnia  2  Yes  38% 
Brazil  1    9% 
Bulgaria  2  Yes  32% 
Chile  1    19% 
Colombia  3 Yes  48% 
Costa Rica  2 Yes  31% 
Croatia  2    22% 
Ecuador  1  Yes   38% 
El Salvador   1    26% 
Ethiopia  1    16% 
Finland  1  Yes  38% 
Georgia  3    47% 
Greece  2  Yes  33% 
Honduras 2    29% 
Hungary  2 Yes  35% 
India  4 Yes  41% 
Indonesia  2    20% 
Jordan  1    6% 
Kenya  2 Yes  27% 
Lebanon  3 Yes  37% 
Lithuania  3    48% 
Malawi  2 Yes  65% 
Malta  3 Yes  71% 
Mexico  2 Yes  23% 
Moldova  2    35% 
Nepal 1    8% 
Pakistan  1  Yes  14% 
Poland  1    8% 
Sierra Leone  2    21% 
Slovakia  2 Yes  40% 
Slovenia  4 Yes  61% 
South Africa  2 Yes  11% 
Sri Lanka  4 Yes  69% 
Swaziland 1    35% 
Sweden 1    27% 
Switzerland  2 Yes  40% 
Turkey  3 Yes  24% 
Uruguay  2 Yes  46% 
Zambia  2    28% 
Zimbabwe 4    25% Table 2 
Testing for differences in financing features across small, medium-sized, and large enterprises 
This table reports average values for small, medium-sized, and large enterprises and t-tests for differences between the three groups. Panel A presents averages  
across all banks, Panel B divides the sample between banks operating in developed and developing countries and Panel C divides the banks by ownership type. 
SE stands for small enterprises. ME stands for medium-sized enterprises. LE refers to large enterprises. *,**,*** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
Panel A: The complete sample 
Variable  SE Mean  ME Mean  LE Mean  t-test SEs vs. MEs  t-test SE vs. LE  t-test ME vs. LE 
Share of total loans (%)  10.86 13.25 32.02  0.91   5.93***   5.20*** 
Share of applications approved (%)  76.31 78.74 81.13  0.49   0.92   0.46 
Share of loans for investment (%)  45.34 47.53 51.60  0.47   1.26   0.87 
Share of secured loans (%)  77.87 80.29 72.18  0.54  -1.13  -1.70* 
Loan fees (% of size of loan)  1.11 0.96 0.76 -0.86 -2.05**  -1.24 
Interest rates on best clients (%)  11.15 10.05 9.50  -1.05 -1.49  -0.51 
Interest rates on worst clients (%)  15.65 14.09 13.32 -1.19 -1.74*  -0.60 
Share of non-performing to total loans (%)  7.36 5.74 3.89 -1.09 -2.23**  -1.55 
 
Panel B: Separating banks by country of operation 
Variable Income 
group 
SE Mean  ME Mean  LE Mean  t-test SE vs. ME  t-test SE vs. LE  t-test ME vs. LE 
Developed  2.48  10.08  27.88   1.99*   3.44***   2.19**  Share of total loans (%) 
Developing  12.01 13.69 32.80   0.58    5.26***    4.78*** 
Developed  66.63 80.01 86.94   0.56    0.83    0.40  Share of applications approved (%) 
Developing  77.42 78.58 80.76   0.24    0.64    0.39 
Developed  72.07 68.47 72.93 -0.25    0.08    0.43  Share of loans for investment (%) 
Developing  42.13 44.41 49.82   0.49    1.52    1.14 
Developed  55.83 59.17 42.80   0.18  -0.75  -1.07  Share of secured loans (%) 
Developing  79.97 82.33 74.85   0.53  -1.01  -1.55 
Developed  0.41 0.38 0.22 -0.15  -1.03  -0.82  Loan fees  (% of size of loan) 
Developing  1.18 1.04 0.83 -0.73  -1.85*  -1.15 
Developed  5.08 4.65 3.99 -0.44  -1.02  -0.62  Interest rates on best clients (%) 
Developing  11.99 10.85 10.22 -1.04  -1.54  -0.56 
Developed  8.97 8.68 7.29 -0.2  -1.02  -0.84  Interest rates on worst clients (%) 
Developing  16.57 14.88 14.09 -1.2  -1.75*  -0.57 
Developed  11.02  8.44 2.54 -0.34  -1.41  -1.26  Share of non-performing loans 
(% of total loans)  Developing  7.01 5.47 4.13 -1.03  -1.73*  -1.04 
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Table 2 
Testing for differences in financing features across small, medium-sized, and large enterprises (cont.) 
This table reports average values for small, medium-sized, and large enterprises and t-tests for differences between the three groups. Panel A presents averages  
across all banks, Panel B divides the sample between banks operating in developed and developing countries and Panel C divides the banks by ownership type. 
SE stands for small enterprises. ME stands for medium-sized enterprises. LE refers to large enterprises. *,**,*** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
Panel C: Separating banks by ownership type 
Variable  Ownership  SE Mean  ME Mean  LE Mean  t-test SE vs. ME  t-test SE vs. LE  t-test ME vs. LE 
Private   8.37  8.06  28.42  -0.09   3.05***   3.09*** 
Government  13.12 17.18 41.23   0.53    3.98***    2.82** 
Share of total loans (%) 
Foreign   11.32  14.48  31.53   0.85   3.99***   3.62*** 
Private    73.45 81.50 78.96   1.11    0.63  -0.32 
Government  82.50 89.89 60.45   1.07  -0.71  -0.96 
Share of applications approved (%) 
Foreign    77.36 72.85 85.75 -0.54    1.25    1.68 
Private   40.43  46.15  50.35   0.71   1.14   0.49 
Government  56.36 45.07 53.50 -1.07  -0.30    1.03 
Share of loans for investment (%) 
Foreign   44.88  49.53  51.72   0.68   0.87   0.30 
Private    69.54 69.60 62.10   0.01  -0.82  -0.83 
Government  77.84 87.96 85.07   1.20    0.78  -0.39 
Share of secured loans (%) 
Foreign    85.91 85.07 72.95 -0.14  -1.79*  -1.75* 
Private    1.32 1.07 0.83 -0.62  -1.18  -0.62 
Government  0.71 0.81 0.78   0.36    0.28  -0.08 
Loan fees (% of size of loan) 
Foreign   1.13 0.94 0.69 -0.94  -2.30**  -1.40 
Private    11.81 10.06 10.01 -0.91  -0.92  -0.03 
Government  10.31 10.64 10.05   0.19  -0.15  -0.33 
Interest rates on best clients (%) 
Foreign   10.96  9.83 8.86 -0.71  -1.22  -0.58 
Private    17.12 15.15 15.22 -0.90  -0.86    0.03 
Government  13.28 13.38 13.19   0.05  -0.05  -0.10 
Interest rates on worst clients (%) 
Foreign    15.48 13.64 11.82 -0.85  -1.65  -0.84 
Private    7.47 5.99 4.83 -0.54  -0.84  -0.50 
Government  7.76 4.39 1.45 -1.15  -2.35**  -2.03* 
Share of non-performing loans 
(% of total loans) 








Testing for differences in firm financing features between banks operating in developed versus developing countries 
This table reports values for small, medium-sized, and large enterprises and t-tests for differences in firm financing features betweens banks in developed and 
developing countries. SE stands for small enterprises. ME stands for medium-sized enterprises. LE refers to large enterprises. *,**,*** denote significance at 10, 
5, and 1 percent, respectively.  
Variable  Firm Type  Mean for Developed Countries  Mean for Developing Countries  t-test 
SEs 12.01  2.48  -3.98*** 
MEs 10.08  13.69  -0.86 
Share of total loans (%) 
LEs 27.88  32.80  -0.61 
SEs 66.63  77.42  -0.51 
MEs 80.01  78.58    0.12 
Share of applications approved (%) 
LEs 86.94  80.76    0.47 
SEs 72.07  42.13    2.67** 
MEs 68.47  44.41    2.37** 
Share of loans for investment (%) 
LEs 72.93  49.82    4.26*** 
SEs 55.83  79.97  -1.67 
MEs 59.17  82.33  -1.97 
Share of secured loans (%) 
LEs 42.80  74.85  -2.92** 
SEs 0.41  1.18  -4.27*** 
MEs 0.38  1.04  -3.48*** 
Loan fees (% of size of loan) 
LEs 0.22  0.83  -3.23*** 
SEs 5.08  11.99  -4.79*** 
MEs 4.65  10.85  -6.09*** 
Interest rates on best clients (%) 
LEs 3.99  10.22  -5.32*** 
SEs 8.97  16.57  -5.22*** 
MEs 8.68  14.88  -4.38*** 
Interest rates on worst clients (%) 
LEs 7.29  14.09  -4.21*** 
SEs 11.02  7.01    0.66 
MEs 8.44  5.47    0.64 
Share of non-performing loans 
(% of total loans) 
LEs 2.54  4.13  -1.19 
 
 
 Table 4 
Testing for differences in firm financing features across bank ownership types 
This table reports values for small, medium-sized and large enterprises and t-tests for differences in firm financing features across foreign, private, and 
government-owned banks. SE stands for small enterprises. ME stands for medium-sized enterprises. LE refers to large enterprises. *,**,*** denote significance 
at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.  










 Private vs. 
Foreign 
t-test    
Foreign vs. 
Government 
t-test   
Private vs. 
Government 
SEs 8.37  11.32  13.12  -0.79 -0.29 -0.98 
MEs 8.06  14.48  17.18  -1.96* -0.39  -1.34 
Share of total loans (%) 
LEs 28.42  31.53  41.23  -0.42 -1.34 -1.53 
SEs 73.45  77.36  82.50  -0.49 -0.66 -1.11 
MEs 81.50  72.85  89.89    1.11  -2.25**  -1.44 
Share of applications approved (%) 
LEs  78.96  85.75  60.45  -0.88   0.82   0.59 
SEs 40.43  44.88  56.36  -0.57 -1.17 -1.56 
MEs  46.15  49.52  45.07  -0.47   0.56   0.13 
Share of loans for investment (%) 
LEs 50.35  51.72  53.50  -0.16 -0.23 -0.39 
SEs 69.54  85.91  77.84  -2.23**    0.88 -0.90 
MEs 69.60  85.07  87.96  -2.20**  -0.56  -2.52** 
Share of secured loans (%) 
LEs 62.10  72.95  85.07  -1.21 -1.42 -2.51** 
SEs  1.31  1.13  0.71   0.55   2.20**   1.76* 
MEs  1.07  0.94  0.81   0.42   0.64   0.76 
Loan fees (% of size of loan) 
LEs  0.83  0.69  0.78   0.45  -0.32   0.13 
SEs  11.81  10.96  10.31   0.47   0.29   0.81 
MEs 10.06  9.83  10.64    0.13  -0.61  -0.32 
Interest rates on best clients (%) 
LEs 10.01  8.86  10.05    0.61  -0.73 -0.02 
SEs  17.12  15.48  13.28   0.74   1.05   1.90* 
MEs  15.15  13.64  13.38   0.71   0.06   0.90 
Interest rates on worst clients (%) 
LEs  15.22  11.82  13.19   1.53  -0.65   0.97 
SEs  7.47  7.08  7.76   0.13   0.02  -0.08 
MEs  5.99  6.16  4.39  -0.09   1.12   0.88 
Share of non-performing loans 
(% of total loans) 
LEs 4.83  3.72  1.45   0.52   1.98*   1.65 
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Figure 1a 
Banks’ definition of small enterprises 












































Banks’ definition of medium-sized enterprises 
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Figure 2a 
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Figure 5a 
Banks’ perception of government programs, by type of country 













































Banks’ perception of government programs, by type of bank 
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  28Figure 6a 
Banks’ ranking of government programs, by type of country 














































Banks’ ranking of government programs, by type of bank 
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Figure 7a 
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